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40 ¦ AUGUST 31, 2020 CONNECTICUT OPINIONS

pertained to the issue of irreparable harm as well plaintiff did not present any evidence of gender
as to the claim that AFC violated the covenant discrimination. She claimed that she was treated
of good faith and fair dealing. However, the differently than male employees, but the court rea-
court also agreed with defendant that the previ- soned that she was not similar situated to those
ously mentioned stipulation significantly limited male employees: they were not administrative as-
the factual findings that needed to be made. The sistants and they were not disciplined for updating
court found that some of the requests that plain- their resumes at work. Therefore, the court grant-
tiff made concerning defendant’s plan to take ed defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
over the franchises in the plaintiff’s territory were
facially overboard and so vague that they would
encompass an unknowable body of records. INTERNET LAW •
Therefore, the court granted plaintiff’s motion to COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA

compel in part and denied it in part. Court Denied Plaintiff’s Motion

EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION for Default Judgment in Copyright
Infringement Lawsuit, Finding
Court Granted Defendant’s Motion Insufficient Evidence That Defendant
for Summary Judgment In Gender And Specifically Was Responsible
Disability Discrimination Lawsuit
CASE: Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe
CASE: Molloy v. Applied Rubber & Plastics, Inc. COURT: U.S. District Court for Connecticut
COURT: U.S. District Court for Connecticut
DOC. NO.: 3:18-cv-00108 DOC. NO.: 3:18-cv-01369
COURT OPINION BY: Meyer
COURT OPINION BY: Dooley DATE: August 13, 2020 • PAGES: 8
DATE: August 14, 2020 • PAGES: 15 Malibu Media, the owner of copyrighted adult
Plaintiff was an administrative assistant at defen- films, sued John Doe, the then-unknown sub-
dant’s company. She understood she was an at- scriber of an account with an assigned IP address,
will employee who could be fired for any reason. alleging violations of the Copyright Act. Plain-
After another assistant was hired, plaintiff asked tiff alleged that this IP address was used to ille-
for a pay raise. Defendant made the decision to gally distribute its copyrighted movies, and later
fire her a week later but did not communicate this determined that defendant was the listed owner
decision to plaintiff. Defendant claims that her of the internet subscriber account assigned to the
termination was due to poor performance, poor IP address. Defendant was served with a sum-
attitude, and the fact she applied for other jobs mons and complaint at an address but did not
while at work. A week later, plaintiff fainted at answer or appear in court. Plaintiff filed a mo-
work and had to take off work for a doctor’s ap- tion for entry of default judgment and the court
pointment. She told defendant that her doctors denied it. The court stated that the issue was
wanted her to stay at home until her future car- whether plaintiff plausibly alleged that it was the
diologist appointment. At this time, defendant defendant specifically that infringed plaintiff’s
informed her that she was fired due to work per- copyright. The court reasoned that beyond al-
formance. Plaintiff claimed that the decision to leging that Doe was the subscriber of the account
terminate her was made when she fainted at work. associated with the IP address, plaintiff did not
Plaintiff initiated an employment discrimination allege any additional facts to make it plausible
action and defendant moved for summary judg- to conclude that it was Doe, and not some other
ment. The court granted the defendant’s motion. person, that was responsible for the infringing ac-
The court first held that plaintiff could not make a tivity. There was no evidence as to whether the
prima facie case of disability discrimination. De- physical address corresponded to a single family
position testimony from the individuals who made home or a multi-unit building, there were no facts
the decision to fire plaintiff established that defen- as to who else resided at the address, and there
dant’s decision to fire plaintiff took place on Au- were no facts as to whether that network was se-
gust 31, 2015, and plaintiff did not faint at work cured or unsecured. The court mentioned that
until September 8, 2015. Plaintiff did not identify this is a time when wireless networks are ubiq-
any direct evidence that supported her claim that uitous and network passwords are freely shared
defendant fired her because they perceived her amongst friends and family. Therefore, the court
as having heart disease. The court then held that denied plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.

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